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War  
**TELEGRAM**

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FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2154  
BT  
S E C R E T USNATO 4937

CONTROL: 4 4 4 8Q  
RECD: 16 OCT '73 6:48PM

NODIS

*NATO - Rumsfeld gives  
US line (not bad)*

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PBOR, MOPS, XF, NATO  
SUBJECT: NATO IMPLICATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT:  
NAC MEETING OF OCTOBER 16, 1973

REF: A) STATE 204576 NODIS, B) USNATO 4919; C) STATE 203897;  
D) STATE 203685

BEGIN SUMMARY: AT RESTRICTED OCTOBER 16 NAC, AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD OUTLINED U.S. ACTIONS TO DATE IN THE MIDDLE-EAST CRISIS AND CALLED UPON NATO PARTNERS FOR COORDINATION OF POLICIES SO THAT TOGETHER WE MIGHT HOLD THE SOVIET UNION TO THE KIND OF CONDUCT ALL OF US HAVE ESTABLISHED AS THE STANDARD FOR EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ALLIES RECEIVED U.S. PRESENTATION WITH GREAT INTEREST AND WITH A RENEWED EMPHASIS ON ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY. ALLIES DISAVOWED ANY INTENTION OF VIEWING U.S.-USSR DETENTE AS SEPARATE FROM SOVIET-EUROPEAN DETENTE. INSTRUCTED CONSULTATIONS ON THE U.S. INITIATIVES SHOULD BEGIN IN THE COUNCIL ON OCTOBER 17. END SUMMARY.

1. LUNS SAID MEETING WAS OCCASIONED BY REQUEST OF OCTOBER 14 FROM GENERAL GOODPASTER (SACEUR) FOR A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAR AND CONSEQUENCES FOR NATO (REF B). HE SUGGESTED THAT BEST MECHANISM FOR RESPONDING WOULD BE A REPORT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL KASTL ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH LUNS WOULD FORWARD IN REPLY.

2. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SAW DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF A DAILY MILITARY ASSESSMENT THAT WOULD ADDRESS SUCH QUESTIONS AS: COULD U.S. REINFORCEMENT OF 2,000 MARINES IN THE MED GIVE RISE TO AN ESCALATION OF THE CONFLICT? LUNS THOUGHT COUNCIL COULD TAKE NOTE OF CERTAIN FACTS AND PREDICT CONSEQUENCES. RUMSFELD ASKED THAT NAC REVIEW KASTL'S REPORT BEFORE SYG FORWARDED IT TO SACEUR. LUNS AGREED.

3. DE ROSE (FRANCE), REMARKED THAT LIKE THE U.S., HE TOO WANTED TO SEE KASTL'S REPORT IN THE COUNCIL BUT SINCE THERE WAS A NEED FOR QUICK RESPONSE, WONDERED WHETHER REPORT SHOULD BE COUNCIL'S AS OPPOSED TO KASTL'S. DE ROSE SAID A COUNCIL

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REPORT MIGHT BE DELAYED WHILE HE WAS WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM PARIS. LUNS IN REPLY CITED PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN 1968 CZECH CRISIS WHEN REPORTS WERE PREPARED UNDER EROSIO'S RESPONSIBILITY AND "LOOKED AT" BY COUNCIL; OTHERWISE, ENORMOUS DELAYS COULD ENSUE. THIS SOLUTION REPRESENTED A COMPROMISE BETWEEN A COUNCIL REPORT AND REPORT BY LUNS HIMSELF. NAC VOICED NO OBJECTION TO THIS PROCEDURE.

4. RUMSFELD THEN MADE INITIAL STATEMENT DRAWN FROM REFS A AND D (SEE TEXTS SEPTEL) OUTLINING U.S. ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS, AND CALLING FOR ALLIED UNITY AND SUPPORT OF U.S. ACTIONS TO PREVENT THE MASSIVE SOVIET AIRLIFT OF ARMS TO ARAB COUNTRIES FROM TIPPING THE MILITARY BALANCE. LUNS ECHOED RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT, SAYING THAT ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WAS MORE IMPORTANT NOW THAN EVER AND COMMENTING THAT HE SENSED A U.S. PREOCCUPATION WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF ALLIANCE DISUNITY.

5. DE STAERCKE COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT PUTS THE QUESTION BEFORE THE COUNCIL. THIS REPRESENTED A GOOD BEGINNING, AND HE HOPED OTHER STATEMENTS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. DE STAERCKE AGREED THAT ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY WAS FUNDAMENTAL AND HE SAW NO INFRACTIONS; NO "SPECIAL" DETENTE EXISTED BETWEEN U.S. AND USSR. INSTEAD, HE CONSIDERED DETENTE TO BE "GLOBAL" BUT AFFECTED BY SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES. U.S. HAS A SPECIAL ROLE BECAUSE OF ITS POWER. DE STAERCKE CHARACTERIZED AS IMPORTANT THE STATEMENT BY THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE RECENTLY THAT DETENTE HAD NOT BEEN AFFECTED BY MIDDLE EAST WAR.

6. TO THE U.S., DE STAERCKE ASKED IF DETENTE WILL BE AFFECTED. BREZHNEV WAS QUOTED AS SAYING DETENTE IS IRREVERSIBLE, AND CAN GO ON. DOES U.S. AGREE? BELGIUM IS CARRYING OUT A DETENTE POLICY, SAME AS U.S.; BUT THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IS FUNDAMENTAL BECAUSE OF ITS SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR.

7. CONCLUDING, DE STAERCKE SAID U.S. SHOULD BE FIRST TO SAY IF DETENTE IS AFFECTED, AND UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE U.S. KEEPING ALLIANCE INFORMED. FINALLY, HE REFERRED TO THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT ON U.S. POLICY (REF C) AND SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED LEBANON AND JORDAN, ASKING: WHAT WILL THIS POLICY HAVE AS A CONSEQUENCE?

8. DE ROSE RESERVED THE RIGHT TO COMMENT FURTHER ON THE U.S. STATEMENT AFTER HIS GOVERNMENT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXAMINE IT. HE WAS SURE HIS GOVERNMENT WOULD ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE U.S. STATEMENTS ON SOLIDARITY. PERSONALLY HE SAW A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SOLIDARITY ON MEANS AND SOLIDARITY

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ON ENDS. DE ROSE TOOK SPECIAL NOTE OF THE U.S. STATEMENT THAT IT IS U.S. INTENTION TO MAINTAIN MILITARY EQUILIBRIUM IN THE FACE OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WONDERED HOW FAR THIS WOULD GO, IN THE U.S. VIEW. HE NOTED AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD HAD SAID THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO QUESTION OF INVOLVEMENT OF U.S. MILITARY FORCES OR PERSONNEL, BUT THE QUESTION STILL REMAINED AS TO EXACTLY WHAT WOULD HAPPEN NEXT.

9. REFERRING TO THE EXPRESSED U.S. AIM IN THE MIDDLE EAST, TO PUT AN END TO THE CONFLICT IN A MANNER THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO LASTING PEACE, DE ROSE SAID ALL ALLIES AGREE WITH THESE AIMS AND NO ALLIES DOUBTED U.S. INTENTIONS. THE ONLY QUESTION WAS WHETHER THESE AIMS WILL BE ACHIEVED BY THE ANNOUNCED U.S. ACTIONS.

10. RUMSFELD NOTED REFERENCES TO STATEMENTS ON DETENTE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND STATED EXACT TEXTS WERE AVAILABLE. ALLIES SHOULD NOTE THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS BEEN EVOLVING AND STATEMENTS SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD WITH REFERENCE TO THE TIME AND THE DATE THEY WERE MADE. RUMSFELD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. IS SUPPLYING THE NATO SITUATION CENTER WITH CURRENT U.S. MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AND ASSESSMENTS OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. OTHERS ARE CONTRIBUTING TOO. ALLIES HAVE MILITARY INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON WHICH TO BASE ASSESSMENTS, HE SAID.

11. AS TO THE POSITION OF THE USG AT THIS MOMENT, THE ALLIES NEED NOT SEEK ELSEWHERE FOR IT. RUMSFELD SAID THE U.S. POSITION IS AS HE IS STATING IT NOW, AND IT IS ON THIS POSITION WE ARE OFFERING TO CONSULT.

12. RUMSFELD THEN PICKED UP THE DE STAERCKE COMMENT ABOUT DETENTE RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE USSR AND MADE HIS SECOND STATEMENT (SEE SEPTTEL) WHICH CLARIFIED AND RE-EMPHASIZED THE U.S. VIEW OF DETENTE AS AN INSTRUMENT TO PROTECT THE COMMON INTEREST OF THE ALLIANCE AND WHICH SUGGESTED HOW THE ALLIANCE NEEDS NOW TO COORDINATE A SET OF POLICIES THAT WILL CONFRONT THE SOVIETS WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF DAMAGE TO THEIR OWN INTERESTS IF THEY CHOOSE TO DAMAGE OURS.

13. ON CONCLUSION OF RUMSFELD'S STATEMENT, LUNS HASTENED TO INTERJECT "WE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES DO NOT DISSOCIATE OUR DETENTE FROM THAT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR. IT IS ALL ONE AND THE SAME THING." LUNS SAID HE WAS CONFIDENT ALL THE ALLIES FELT THIS SAME WAY.

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14. FRG REP (KRAPP) EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR RUMSFELD'S "VERY INTERESTING AND VALUABLE SECOND STATEMENT." HE AGREED THAT THIS WAS A MAJOR TEST OF ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, AND HE SAID EACH MEMBER SHOULD EXAMINE ALL OF ITS RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE SOVIETS TO SEE WHAT EACH CAN DO.

15. DE STAERCKE SAID THAT CONSULTATION WAS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF SOLIDARITY AND THAT ONE ASPECT OF CONSULTATION WAS THE POSSIBILITY TO CONTRADICT. DE STAERCKE EXPOUNDED ON THE NECESSITY FOR CONSULTATIONS AND SAID THAT HARD QUESTIONS MUST BE ADDRESSED -- "ARE WE ON THE EVE OF ANOTHER CUBAN CRISIS?" "IN WHICH DIRECTION ARE WE READY TO GO IF THE SITUATION BECOMES WORSE?"

16. RUMSFELD SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS PUT BEFORE THE COUNCIL A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT SUBJECTS FOR CONSULTATION. HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THE COUNCIL COULD BEGIN INSTRUCTED COMMENTS UPON THEM ON OCTOBER 17.

17. THE GREEK REP (CHORAFAS) POINTED TO THE NEED FOR MAKING SOME DETERMINATION AS TO WHAT SOVIET INTENTIONS WERE AT THIS TIME. THE DANISH REP (SVART) AGREED BUT SAID THERE WAS A QUESTION AS TO WHAT EXTENT THE SOVIET UNION WAS ABLE TO INFLUENCE EVENTS AT THE PRESENT TIME. LUNS COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIET AIRLIFT AND SOVIET APPEALS TO ARABS TO JOIN THE WAR INDICATED SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE.

18. LUNS INQUIRED WHAT MIGHT BE SAID TO THE PRESS ABOUT TODAY'S NAC. IT WAS AGREED THAT IF ASKED THE NATO SPOKESMAN WOULD CONFIRM THAT THERE WAS A MEETING. IF ASKED HE WOULD CONFIRM THAT THE MIDDLE EAST WAS DISCUSSED. HE WOULD GO NO FURTHER.

19. DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT AS DESIRED.  
RUMSFELD

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